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Non-technical summary 
 
Labor market integration of immigrants provides a difficulty in many countries. As a consequence, 
immigrants are substantially overrepresented in welfare systems. Despite forming a substantial share 
of all welfare recipients, relatively little is known about the impact of welfare-to-work programs on 
labor market outcomes of this group. This paper explicitly focuses on immigrants and evaluates the 
effects of a major German welfare-to-work program, namely off-the-job short-term training, on the 
probability of exiting the welfare system by taking up employment. The core questions are: Are pro-
grams similarly effective for immigrants and natives? And, if differences in effects are observable 
between both ethnic groups, what are the causes of these differences? Are they due to observable dif-
ferences in socio-demographic characteristics or are they due to unobservable differences which must 
be attributed to the immigrant status?  
To answer these questions, we use a sample of about 80,000 immigrants and 80,000 natives from 
comprehensive register data of the inflows into welfare in 2006. The effects of natives are estimated to 
benchmark the effects for immigrants. The data provide detailed information about socio-demographic 
characteristics, employment history, program participation and the outcome variable of interest; in 
addition, they enable identification of immigrants beyond the concept of citizenship. Four different 
types of training are distinguished: aptitude tests, job search training, skill provision, and combined 
training programs. For the estimation of the treatment effects, we employ propensity score matching 
estimators in a dynamic setting, where treatment effects vary conditionally on the preceding duration 
in welfare. To answer the question whether differences in effects are caused by differences in the 
composition of the native and immigrant population in the welfare system (e.g. due to differences in 
education or in the age structure) or due to an immigrant fixed effect we suggest and apply a matching 
based decomposition of differences in treatment effects. 
Our estimation results show that the considered training programs exhibit substantial effect heteroge-
neity. For aptitude tests we observe on average positive employment effects. While in the sample of 
women treatment effects are larger for natives than for immigrants, the picture is ambiguous for men 
depending on the timing of the training. Aptitude tests starting in the second or third quarter of welfare 
receipt generate larger treatment effects for immigrants, whereas native men benefit more from tests in 
the first quarter. The difference in treatment effects of natives and immigrants in the first quarter is 
mainly due to differences in observable characteristics between the two ethnic groups. Keeping all 
covariates constant, immigrants tend to benefit even more from aptitude tests than natives. 
Job search training is ineffective for men irrespective of being an immigrant or not. Native women 
benefit from this form of training, while immigrant females face negative treatment effects. The large 
difference in treatment effects of native and immigrant women cannot be explained by observable 
characteristics and must instead be attributed to an immigrant fixed effect. Holding everything else 
constant, immigrant females participating at job search training have a nearly 15 percentage point 
lower treatment effect than native participants. Even though the negative immigrant fixed effect fades 
away nine months after the program starts, this result gives cause for serious concern. Job search train-
ing decreases rather than increases employment chances of female immigrants.  
In contrast, female immigrants clearly benefit from skill provision, which is a program exhibiting posi-
tive effects in general when assigned early during the welfare spell. For this form of training the im-
migrant fixed effect increases over time and amounts to 14 percentage points one year after program 
start. Thus, when netting out observable differences between immigrants and natives, the former have 
on average a 14 percentage points larger treatment effect than the latter.  
For the combined training programs, we do not find statistically significant differences in any sub-
group. These results reflect the finding that combined programs are rather ineffective for both ethnic 
groups and for both genders. The general ineffectiveness of combined training programs might be due 
to the characteristics of the targeted group, since combined programs are in particular assigned to 
those persons who were out of labor force for a substantial fraction of the final two years before treat-
ment. These persons are likely to face multiple obstacles for employment uptake, which might not be 
remediable by combined training programs. 
  
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Der Anteil von Immigranten in Systemen der sozialen Sicherung ist in vielen Ländern der OECD  
stark überproportional. In Deutschland hatten im Jahr 2006 mehr als 34% aller erwerbsfähigen Hilfe-
bedürftigen einen Migrationshintergrund, wohingegen der Anteil in der gesamten Bevölkerung ledig-
lich 19.5% betrug. Trotz dieser starken Betroffenheit von Hilfebedürftigkeit ist bisher wenig über die 
Wirkung von arbeitsmarktpolitischen Maßnahmen auf die Arbeitsmarktchancen der Immigranten be-
kannt. Diese Studie untersucht die Beschäftigungswirkungen von kurzen außerbetrieblichen Trai-
ningsmaßnahmen für Personen mit Migrationshintergrund, die ein zentrales Element der arbeitsmarkt-
politischen Aktivierung in Deutschland sind. Gibt es Unterschiede in der Wirksamkeit von Trainings-
maßnahmen zwischen Immigranten und Einheimischen? Worauf sind potentielle Unterschiede zu-
rückzuführen? Haben sie ihre Ursache in beobachtbaren Unterschieden der soziodemographischen 
Charakteristika beider Gruppen oder sind sie in unbeobachtbaren Unterschieden begründet, die durch 
den Migrationshintergrund an sich bedingt sind?  
Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, verwenden wir Geschäftsdaten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit mit 
umfangreichen Informationen zu jeweils 80,000 Immigranten und Deutschen ohne Migrationshin-
tergrund, die im Jahr 2006 in den Rechtskreis des SGB II zugegangen sind. Wir unterscheiden vier 
verschiedene Trainingsmaßnahmen: Eignungsfeststellungen, Bewerbungstrainings, Vermittlung von 
Kenntnissen und Maßnahmekombinationen. Die Wirkungen der Maßnahmen für Deutsche ohne 
Migrationshintergrund bilden den Referenzmaßstab. Zur Berechnung der Maßnahmeeffekte verwen-
den wir einen dynamischen Propensity Score-Matching-Ansatz. Zur Beantwortung der Frage, ob Un-
terschiede in den Maßnahmeeffekten zwischen Personen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund auf eine 
unterschiedliche soziodemographische Zusammensetzung beider Gruppen zurückzuführen sind oder 
auf dem Migrationshintergrund an sich beruhen, schlagen wir eine Dekomposition der Effekte vor. 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse zeigen eine erhebliche Heterogenität in den Wirkungen der Trainings-
maßnahmen. Bei den Eignungsfeststellungsmaßnahmen beobachten wir im Durchschnitt positive Be-
schäftigungseffekte. Während bei den Frauen ohne Migrationshintergrund die Effekte stärker ausge-
prägt sind als für Immigrantinnen, ergibt sich für Männer kein eindeutiges Bild. Hier variiert die rela-
tive Stärke der Effekte je nach dem Zeitpunkt des Maßnahmeeinsatzes. Die Unterschiede der Maß-
nahmeeffekte zwischen Personen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund lassen sich vor allem auf Unter-
schiede in beobachtbaren Merkmalen beider Gruppen zurückführen. Kontrolliert man für alle diese 
Merkmale zeigt sich sogar, dass Immigranten und Immigrantinnen stärker von den Eignungsfeststel-
lungen profitieren als einheimische erwerbsfähige Hilfebedürftige.  
Bewerbungstrainings sind bei Männern unabhängig vom Migrationshintergrund ohne signifikante 
Wirkung. Frauen ohne Migrationshintergrund profitieren von dieser Form des Trainings, wohingegen 
die Beschäftigungschancen von Immigrantinnen negativ beeinflusst werden. Dieser große Wirkungs-
unterschied ist nicht auf beobachtbare Unterschiede zwischen den beiden ethnischen Gruppen zurück-
zuführen, sondern entsteht durch den Migrationshintergrund an sich. Kontrolliert man für alle beob-
achtbaren Merkmale haben Immigrantinnen einen um 15 Prozentpunkte niedrigeren Eingliederungser-
folg als deutsche Teilnehmerinnen. Auch wenn sich dieser substantielle Unterschied über die Zeit 
abschwächt und etwa 9 Monate nach Maßnahmebeginn verschwindet, macht er deutlich, dass Bewer-
bungstrainings anders als intendiert die Beschäftigungschancen von Immigrantinnen verschlechtern 
anstatt verbessern. 
Im Gegensatz zu den Bewerbungstrainings zeigt sich für die Vermittlung von Kenntnissen, dass Im-
migrantinnen von diesen Maßnahmen besonders profitieren. Ein Jahr nach Maßnahmebeginn ist der 
Maßnahmeeffekt für Frauen mit Migrationshintergrund um 14 Prozentpunkte höher als für Frauen, die 
in allen Merkmalen identisch sind, aber keinen Migrationshintergrund aufweisen. Bei den Männern 
zeigen sich keine signifikanten Unterschiede in der Maßnahmewirkung zwischen Immigranten und 
Deutschen ohne Migrationshintergrund. Bei den Maßnahmekombinationen lässt sich für keine der 
betrachteten Personengruppen eine signifikante Wirkung erkennen.  
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1 Introduction
We evaluate the effects of four different short-term off-the-job training programs on the
probability of exiting the welfare system by taking up employment for native and immi-
grant welfare recipients in Germany. In particular, we are interested in the effects for
immigrant welfare recipients. Are programs similarly effective compared to natives? And,
if differences in effects are observable between natives and immigrants, what are the causes
of these differences? To answer these questions, we use a sample of about 160,000 obser-
vations from comprehensive register data of the inflows into welfare in 2006. These data
of native and immigrants provide detailed information about sociodemographic character-
istics, employment history, program participation and the outcome variable of interest; in
addition, they enable identification of immigrants beyond the concept of citizenship. For
the estimation of the treatment effects, we employ propensity score matching estimators
in a dynamic setting (see Sianesi, 2004), where treatment effects vary conditionally on
the preceding duration in welfare. To answer the question whether differences in effects
are caused by differences in the composition of the native and immigrant population in
the welfare system (e.g. due to differences in education or in the employment history) or
due to an immigrant fixed effect we suggest and apply a matching based decomposition of
differences in treatment effects.
Although there is a substantial literature analyzing the impacts of short-term training
programs (see Kluve, 2006 for an overview on the international evidence) and there are a
number of studies analyzing the programs in Germany1, relatively little is known about
the impacts on labor market outcomes for immigrants. Nevertheless, analyzing the ef-
fects for immigrants is important. Within the group of welfare recipients immigrants are
clearly over-represented. In 2006, more than 34% of all welfare recipients were immigrants
(Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales, 2009) while the corresponding share of the
population was only about 19.5% (see Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). Immigrants have
lower participation rates and higher unemployment rates not only in Germany but in most
European countries, see OECD (2008) for a comprehensive description. Successful labor
market integration of these persons is therefore an issue in most countries, and different
1Short-term training programs for unemployed individuals in Germany have been evaluated, for exam-
ple, by Hujer et al. (2006), Biewen et al. (2007) and Lechner and Wunsch (2008). In addition, programs
for welfare recipients have been studied, e.g. by Wolff and Jozwiack (2007), Kopf (2009) and Huber et al.
(2009).
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integration plans have been adopted. Given the over-representation in welfare and un-
employment, we would perceive that immigrants have larger difficulties for labor market
integration compared to natives due to a lower degree of employability.
Participation in short-term training programs should help to improve employability and
the programs are intended to increase the search efficiency and to improve productivity.
However, whether these programs reach their purposes for immigrants (as for natives)
is not clear ex ante and varying impacts can occur for a number of reasons. Clearly,
successful integration depends on labor demand. If immigrants’ productivity is too low
and programs are not able to increase the productivity sufficiently to meet the required
standards, there will be no effects. Similarly, if potential employers apply some kind of sta-
tistical discrimination with respect to immigrants then even if productivity is improved by
participation the probability of placement could be lower compared to natives. Even in the
absence of demand side effects, differences in placement may result from a different value
of the programs for immigrants compared to natives. For example, to train immigrants
in formally writing job applications may be counterproductive if the traditional search
strategy is to rely on networks and contacts within the community. On the other hand,
program participation could reveal unexpectedly high levels of productivity of treated im-
migrants to caseworkers, who might have undervalued these persons before assignment
due to a lower average productivity among immigrants. This learn effect might induce
caseworkers to increase their placement effort for treated immigrants which in turn might
lead to larger treatment effects of short-term training for immigrants than for comparable
native welfare recipients.
Determining the source of differences in program effectiveness between the two ethnic
groups is important. If, for example, differences in program effectiveness are driven by
differences in the composition of native and immigrant welfare recipients it implies a
general potential for welfare agencies to improve the targeting of programs to participants.
If, on the other hand, differences are due to the immigrant characteristic, then this points
to discrimination in the effectiveness of short-term training programs and the question
arises whether the use of programs for specific ethnic groups is reasonable at all. Clearly,
both possible explanations for differences in program effects must cause concern among
policy makers. However, since effect differences due to an immigrant fixed effect per se are
especially problematic and affect more than one third of the welfare population, we will
mainly focus on the contribution of the immigrant fixed effect to the observed differences
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in the effectiveness of training programs. This paper thus contributes, on the one hand,
to the small international literature on the effects of training and active labor market
policy (ALMP) for immigrants, and, on the other hand, to the comprehensive literature
on program evaluation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents details of the
German welfare system and introduces the training programs of interest. In section 3
we discuss the related literature. The data used in the empirical analysis is described in
section 4. Our evaluation approach and the propensity-score based decomposition method
of differences in treatment effects between natives and immigrants is discussed in section
5. In section 6 we present the estimation results. The final section concludes. In addition,
we provide a Data Appendix for selected descriptive statistics of our estimation sample.
2 Institutional Background
The German welfare system was substantially reformed at the beginning of 2005 with the
introduction of the new Social Code II (Sozialgesetzbuch II ).2 Until 2005, welfare recipi-
ents were eligible for social assistance (SA) if they had not contributed to unemployment
insurance before. In addition, persons whose unemployment benefit (UB) claims had ex-
pired were eligible for unemployment assistance (UA). If UA was too low to provide a
minimum living standard, a combination of UA and SA was granted. In contrast to UB,
UA and SA were both means-tested. With the welfare reform of January 2005, both pro-
grams were replaced by the so-called unemployment benefits II scheme (UBII). As opposed
to UA, which replaced up to 57% of the previous net earnings, UBII (as former SA) does
not depend on former earnings. The means-test takes into account the wealth and income
of all individuals living in the household. At the beginning of 2005, UBII benefits for a
single individual without children amounted to EUR 345 in West Germany and to EUR
331 in East Germany. Meanwhile, the level of UBII in East Germany was adjusted to
the Western level and UBII was slightly raised in both parts to compensate for inflation
(359 Euro since July 09). Moreover, UBII welfare payments also include compulsory social
2This reform was the last part of a series of four major reforms of the German labor market which were
enacted between 2003 and 2005. These reforms have become known as ‘Hartz reforms’ named after the
chairman of the commission proposing the reforms. Since the reform of the welfare system is the last of the
four reforms it is also referred to as the ‘Hartz IV reform’. See Jacobi and Kluve (2007) for a description
of all four ‘Hartz reforms’.
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insurance contributions, rents and housing costs. Additional expenses for special needs
may also be covered.
In order to be eligible for UBII, persons have to be aged 15 to 64 years and be able to
work for at least 15 hours per week. It is important to note that unemployment is not a
prerequisite for receipt of UBII. Individuals who are employed but whose household in-
come is too low are also eligible for UBII. Claimants capable of work have to register with
the local welfare agency and are obliged to participate in welfare-to-work programs. This
obligation marks an important change in German welfare policy. Namely, for the first time
welfare recipients became a target group of labor market activation. Before 2005, hardly
any effort was made to reintegrate these persons into the labor market and welfare solely
relied on passive benefit payments. Since 2005, the welfare recipients’ rights and duties in
the activation process are set out in a so-called ‘integration contract’ (Eingliederungsvere-
inbarung), an agreement between the welfare agency and the benefit recipient containing
obligations with respect to program participation and job search activities, as well as de-
tailing the services provided by the welfare agency. The integration contract is usually set
up after the first meeting of a welfare recipient with the caseworker. The caseworker coun-
sels and advises the welfare recipient and decides about placement in one of the various
ALMP programs.
Include Table 1 about here
Table 1 provides some selected figures concerning the number of entitled persons to UBII
and the corresponding spending. As becomes obvious, on average about 5 million people
were entitled to UBII benefits; however, referring to the years from 2006 onwards a slight
decline from about 5.4 million to 5.0 million persons could be established. The spending
amounted to more than 30 billion Euro per year for passive UBII benefits. Corresponding
to the shift in the number of entitled persons, spending declined slightly between 2006
and 2008. In contrast, the figures for the spending on ALMP emphasize the increased
importance of the newly introduced need to activate the former welfare recipients. Whereas
in 2005 only 3.1 billion Euro were spent overall, this figure increased by more than 50
percent up to 4.7 billion Euro in 2008. Within the scope of ALMP programs, short-term
training programs are a quite frequently used measure. During the last years, between 411
and about 628 thousand UBII recipients per year have participated in these programs.3
3Short-term training programs were introduced in Germany with the enaction of Social Code III
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The primary purpose of short-term training programs is to improve the employment
prospects of the participating individuals. For this reason, programs consist of three
different types of measures (modules) that can be accomplished separately or in combi-
nation and allow a flexible implementation in line with the specific needs of the welfare
recipients and the options of the local welfare agencies as well. The first type of courses
are aptitude tests (Eignungsfeststellungen) which last for up to four weeks. These tests
are used to assess the suitability of participants in terms of skills, capability and labor
market opportunities for specific occupations. During the assessment process occupation
specific skills are provided which shall help to improve employment chances in the re-
spective occupations. The measures of the second type of short-term training programs
aim at improving the applicant’s presentation and job search abilities (U¨berpru¨fung der
Verfu¨gbarkeit/Bewerbertraining). The activities support the individual’s efforts to find
work or efforts by the welfare agency to place him/her, especially through job-application
training, counseling on job search possibilities or measures assessing the person’s willing-
ness and ability to work (work-tests). Measures of the second type are promoted for up
to two weeks and will be referred to as job search training in this analysis. The third
type contains practical training of the participants (for up to eight weeks) providing nec-
essary skills and techniques required for placement in employment or vocational training
(Vermittlung notwendiger Kenntnisse und Fertigkeiten). The courses cover, for example,
specific working techniques like business administration or computer courses. We will
refer to this form of training as skill provision. Finally, combinations of modules, e.g.,
a job aptitude test followed by a computer course, could be granted for a maximum of
twelve weeks. This is the fourth type of training and will be referred to as combined
training programs. Financial support during the training is provided by the FEA and
covers course costs, examination fees, and travel grants as well as child care. In addition,
participants receive UBII payments. Decisions about support of courses and placement
of welfare recipients are made by the welfare agencies. Support is authorized on recom-
mendation or with the approval of the agency only and activities are often initiated by
caseworkers. However, short-term training programs may be initiated by welfare recip-
ients as well. Short-term training programs could be provided on-the-job within firms
(Sozialgesetzbuch III ) in 1997/1998. They replaced the former short-term qualification measures (kurzzeit-
ige Qualifizierungsmaßnahmen), training measures for UB and UA recipients and employment counseling
measures (Maßnahmen der Arbeitsberatung). In 2005, the rules from Social Code III were adopted in
Social Code II.
6
and off-the-job. If provided off-the-job, activities are conducted by specialized service
providers (Bildungstra¨ger). Evaluation of the treatment effects of on-the-job courses may
be complicated due to potential windfall gains of the supporting employers that have to
be considered. For this reason, we concentrate the analysis on off-the-job courses only.
The institutional set-up of short-term training programs implies two channels through
which programs affect the job search of the participants and, therefore, the employment
chances and the probability of leaving welfare. On the one hand, the modules that improve
or support the job placement on part of the welfare agency or the self-contained job search
of the participants can be expected to improve the search behavior of the participants by
increasing the intensity as well as the efficiency of the search efforts. More efficient job
search will lead to an increase in the job offer arrival rate, which increases the probability of
leaving welfare. However, it will make job seekers more selective with respect to potential
job offer and induces a negative indirect effect on the transition. The overall effect is
then the sum of the positive direct and the negative indirect effect. Van den Berg (1994)
provides sufficient conditions for the wage offer distribution that ensure a positive net
effect. On the other hand, participation in short-term training could improve the job-
relevant skills and therefore increase the job opportunities of the participants. Increasing
the skills is equivalent to increasing productivity which enables participants to apply for
jobs associated with on average higher wages. In terms of job search theory this equals a
shift of the wage offer distribution to the right. According to Mortensen (1986), an increase
in the mean of the wage offer distribution increases the reservation wage by an amount less
than the increase in the mean, and, therefore, this will increase the probability of leaving
welfare as well. Clearly, the theoretical perspective implies positive effects of participation
in a short-term training program on the probability of leaving welfare and the probability
of taking up employment. However, for the theoretically derived positive effects to hold
in reality there have to be potential employers willing to engage the participants in the
programs. Despite the decrease in the reservation wage due to the increased search effort
or the higher productivity obtained in the practical training, participants may still possess
productivities too low to be remunerated by the market. In that case, there will be no
positive effects of participation.
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3 Related Literature
Referring to the literature that analyses ALMP programs with a particular focus on im-
migrants, Clausen et al. (2009) evaluate the effects of ALMP programs on the hazard rate
into regular employment for newly arrived immigrants in Denmark.4 The programs are
part of the integration policies specifically designed for facilitating the labor-market inte-
gration of newly arrived immigrants (introduced in 1999). The emphasis is on programs
taking account of language skills. All in all, six different programs are evaluated. Within
these programs so-called counseling and upgrading programs come closest to the short-
term training programs we analyze here. The counseling and upgrading programs provide
counseling regarding employment and education options but may also include voluntary
unpaid work, adult education and supplementary training. The results show negative ef-
fects of counseling and upgrading which seems to be in contrast to the literature in that
most previous studies find positive effects of counseling; however, the authors mitigate
their results by noting that the effects of counseling and upgrading are only significant in
the larger of the two samples used.
In addition, Cohen-Goldner and Eckstein (2009) evaluate a government provided training
programme for highly-skilled female immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in
Israel. For estimation of effects, they apply dynamic programming and results show that
training has no significant impact on the mean offered wage in blue-collar jobs, but does
increase the mean offered wage in white-collar jobs. Nevertheless, training increases the
probability of receiving a job offer significantly. However, these programs are not directly
comparable to the short-term training in Germany as programs last for six months with
26 hours of study per week and participation rates are clearly higher (about 47% of all
immigrants in Israel).
A third study is provided by Ha¨ma¨la¨inen and Sarvima¨ki (2008). They evaluate the effects
of integration plans for immigrants in Finland, which have the aim to promote integration,
equality and freedom of choice by providing measures that help to achieve information and
skills needed in Finnish society. The integration plan provides an individualized pathway
containing measures of acquiring language skills, preparatory and/or vocational training,
career counseling, rehabilitation, work practice and so forth; typically various measures are
4In addition, Rosholm and Vejlin (2010) analyze the effects of reducing income transfers to refugee
immigrants. However, this is a change of passive labor market policy.
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combined in paths in which one measure precedes another; the integration plan is aborted
if an immigrant finds permanent, full-time employment (or becomes full-time student).
Based on a regression discontinuity design estimator, the results show positive effects of
the integration plan. The authors explain the positive effects to have mainly arisen from
individually tailored plans combined with better co-ordination of the existing resources.
Hence, it implies that individualized plans provide a fairly cost-efficient way to support
the integration of immigrants (or at least of those who are likely to participate in the labor
force). Unfortunately, the analysis does not go into detail how important training courses
are for the labor market success of the immigrants.
In contrast to the foreign programs, which are specifically designed for (newly arrived)
immigrants, German welfare-to-work programs including short-term training are identical
for immigrants and natives. The effects of short-term training programs on the employ-
ment chances of welfare recipients in Germany have been analyzed by Wolff and Jozwiack
(2007), Huber et al. (2009), and Kopf (2009) already. The studies vary with respect to the
time horizon and the data used for estimation, but all apply propensity score matching
estimators. Wolff and Jozwiack (2007) use register data similar to those used here and
also consider immigrants as a subgroup in the analysis. However, the definition of immi-
grant status is not as detailed as in our study and the authors do not distinguish between
different training modules. They find that short-term off-the-job training programs are on
average ineffective among immigrant men to increase the probability of exiting the welfare
system by taking up employment. For women with migration background significantly
negative treatment effects are estimated for the first six months after the program start,
which then fade away towards the end of the observation period (20 months). The employ-
ment chances of women without migration background living in West Germany are also
reduced twenty months after the treatment, while there is no significant effect on native
women in East Germany and on native men irrespective of the location.
Huber et al. (2009) use combined administrative and survey data to evaluate three types
of welfare-to-work programs including short-term training, but they also do not distinguish
between different training modules. Pooling all modules together, they estimate positive
employment effects of short-term training, which are mainly driven by the subsample of
persons without migration background. The estimated effects for immigrants are positive
as well, but they are statistically not significant. Insignificance might be due to the
relatively low number of treated observations with migration background.
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Kopf (2009) uses the same data as Wolff and Jozwiack (2007) but distinguishes five types
of off-the-job training programs including application training, work tests, aptitude tests,
skill training courses, and combined programs. Her distinction is similar to the one used
by us, but we pool application training and work tests into one category since they have
overlapping contents. Kopf (2009) runs separate estimations for men and women and for
East and West Germany, but does not consider immigrants. She finds that application
training has negative locking-in effects lasting up to one year in the subsample of East Ger-
man men. After the locking-in phase effects are close to zero and statistically insignificant
in all subgroups. Work tests exhibit a shorter locking-in period than application training
does. Nevertheless, only for West German men are significantly positive effects observed
one and a half years after the program start. Aptitude tests show positive effects for men
in both parts of Germany and for East German women, whereas West German women do
not seem to benefit. For skill training the estimates are significantly positive within all
subgroups, but again effects are least pronounced among West German women. Combined
training programs are rather ineffective. Here, effects become significantly positive only
for West German men 18 months after the program start and for East German women 6
to 13 month after treatment so that the effect in this group is only temporary.
4 Data
For the empirical analysis, we use a sample of all inflows into welfare in Germany from
January, 1st 2006 to December, 31st 2006. The data stem from administrative records of
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, FEA) and were provided by
the Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg. To ensure that inflows in the data
are not short-term recurrences of welfare episodes, for example due to false reporting or
data errors, only persons are regarded who have not been registered in welfare for at least
three months before the sampling date. The data were merged from five different sources
of administrative records. The main source is the Integrated Employment Biography data
set (Integrierte Erwerbsbiographien, IEB), which provides comprehensive information with
regard to the socio-demographic situation, the labor market history, and the participation
in ALMP programs. The detailed data allow distinction of the four types of off-the-job
short-term training programs (three modules and program combinations) for the empirical
analysis. The information included in IEB covers the years 1990 to 2007 and, thus, provides
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a sufficient source of background information for inflows into UBII in 2006. These data
allow for quite a detailed characterization of the current situation and the labor market
chances of the UBII recipients. However, since UBII entitlement is means-tested with
consideration of the wealth and the income of further household members, we merge
information on further persons living in the households that are recorded in the Benefit
History Master Records (Leistungshistorikgrunddatei, BHMR).
In the empirical analysis, we distinguish the following ethnic groups: Immigrants comprise
all foreigners and naturalized persons. Foreigners are persons who do not possess German
citizenship. The naturalized group contains, on the one hand, German resettlers from
Eastern Europe, and, on the other hand, naturalized foreigners. Although citizenship is
recorded in IEB as well, identification of naturalized immigrants and German resettlers
from Eastern Europe could not be obtained from this dataset. To identify resettlers we
consider the information on the immigration date recorded in the Job Seeker Statistics (Ar-
beitsuchendenstatistik, ASU) dating back to 1990, which explicitly contains the information
on resettler status. To identify naturalized immigrants, we use the information from
the IEB for the years 1990 to 2007 and in addition the Employment History Records
(Bescha¨ftigtenhistorik, EHR) for the years 1975 to 1989. A person with German citizenship
at the sampling date who were recorded being a foreigner in any spell since 1975 is treated
as a naturalized. Unfortunately, the administrative records of the FEA contain neither
information about the place of birth nor about the parents of the individual. Moreover,
since minors (persons under 18 years of age) do not appear in any of these data sources, we
are neither able to identify immigrants who were naturalized at an early age nor distinguish
first and second generation immigrants.
As the main purpose of ALMP is to eliminate welfare dependency, we could use the drop-
off rate from welfare as an outcome variable to evaluate the effects of short-term training
programs and to decompose the differences in the effects. However, elimination of welfare
dependency does not solely depend on the direct effects for the individual under study
but may result from changes in the household as well, e.g. if the income of the partner
increases. Therefore, we estimate the effects of training on the drop-off rate from welfare
conditional on employment uptake of the individual. This outcome variable measures
whether the training is able to improve the situation of a treated individual such that there
is a transition to employment and welfare dependency is terminated. The variable can be
observed on a monthly basis until July 2008 and has been merged from the Employment
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Statistics Register (Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik, ESR).5
In line with the two empirical questions of the paper, i.e. the evaluation of the program
effects for immigrants and natives and the decomposition of effect differences, the analysis
sample was drawn in a 1:1 ratio of immigrants and native Germans on regional level. In a
first step, 80,000 immigrants were randomly drawn from the total inflow population into
welfare in 2006. Then in a second step, for each immigrant randomly drawn from a welfare
agency district, one native German was drawn from the same district resulting in an overall
sample of about 160,000 welfare recipients. Therefore, immigrant-native German ratios
are balanced across districts and should mitigate regional imbalances in the distribution
of immigrants that could affect the estimates.
For the analysis presented here, the sample is restricted to unemployed welfare recipients
aged 18 to 57 years at the sampling date. Although unemployment is not a prerequisite for
receiving welfare benefits, it is required for participation in full-time short-term training
programs. In addition, welfare recipients younger than 18 years are excluded so that
the estimates are not affected by compulsory schooling. Welfare recipients aged 58 years
and above are eligible for so-called relaxed welfare receipt. Within this scheme active
job search is not required for benefit entitlement and claimants can rely on welfare until
(early) retirement age. The final sample for the analysis contains 82,774 observations of
which slightly more than half are natives (43,344) and the rest are immigrants (39,430).
Using the information in the IEB, we identify for each person the first assigned program
during the welfare spell and evaluate participation against nonparticipation in any other
program at the time starting the program.
As can be seen from the descriptive statistics provided in the Data Appendix, 4,628 of the
43,344 natives (2,851 men and 1,777 women) are assigned to one of the four considered
short-term training programs during the first year of their welfare spell. Among the
immigrants the ratio of participants is lower, with only 3,871 individuals (2,599 men
and 1,272 women) treated. Despite this difference in the participation ratios, the mix of
5It has to be noted that due to delays in reporting by employers, the information available in the
ESR has an up to two-year time lag. Therefore, in a first step the FEA forecasts the information and
then in a second step the forecast is replaced by the actually reported information. In consequence,
assessing contemporary effects of welfare-to-work programs is possible, but the results will be based purely
on forecasted employment information. As the evaluation of program effects should be based on actually
reported, rather than forecasted information, our observation period ends in July 2008. Data were extracted
in February 2009. However, as the time lag between the corresponding date of information and the
extraction from the ESR for our analysis amounted to only eight months, the relation between reported
and forecasted data was extensively checked. Based on the results of Fro¨hlich, Kaimer, and Stamm (2004),
the share of forecasted data used in the analysis amounts to between four and ten percent at maximum.
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assigned programs is similar in both ethnic groups. Aptitude tests are most frequently
assigned as first program both for natives and immigrants. Nearly one third of all assigned
short-term training programs are aptitude tests. Skill provision and combined training
programs have a share of about 25% each. Job search training is used with the lowest
frequency resulting in a share of somewhat less than 20%.
Selection into the different training programs is mainly driven by the employment bi-
ography of individuals. While sociodemographic characteristics are fairly similar among
participants in the four considered programs, we observe substantial differences with re-
spect to the time spent in employment, unemployment and out of the labor force prior to
program start. These differences can be noticed both for natives and immigrants.
Combined training programs are assigned in particular to those persons who were out of
the labor force for a very long period during the final two years before treatment. These
individuals face multiple disadvantages when trying to get back to employment. Thus, the
combined training program attempts to comprehensively tackle these disadvantages. Ap-
titude tests and skill provision are mainly targeted at those persons with a high incidence
of unemployment. This reflects the fact that these programs are used to learn about the
suitability of participants for different occupations and to refresh general human capital
which might have been depreciated during unemployment. In contrast, job search train-
ing is focused on individuals with fairly good employment records who recently entered
unemployment. These persons still have a valuable human capital stock but need support
for writing job applications and attending job interviews.
Even though native and immigrant participants in the different training programs have
similar employment biographies, they are distinct with respect to some sociodemographic
characteristics. Considerable differences exist in terms of household composition. Immi-
grants are less frequently single and, thus, household size for immigrants is on average
larger than for natives. Moreover, the variation in educational achievement is larger for
immigrants than for natives. We observe a relatively large share of immigrants without
any school leaving certificate, but also a noticeable share of persons with a university en-
trance diploma, especially among women. In addition, differences between the two ethnic
groups are apparent in the lower end of the age distribution. While the share of treated
immigrants aged between 18 and 24 is lower than for natives, the opposite is true for 25
to 34 aged individuals. The differences are more pronounced for men than for women.
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However, despite these differences, there is sufficient overlap in the distribution of covari-
ates of natives and immigrants so that both groups are comparable with respect to the
effectiveness of training programs.
5 Evaluation Approach
5.1 Estimation of Treatment Effects
The evaluation of the treatment effects of a participation in a short-term training program
on the drop-off rates from welfare has to consider the set-up of the comprehensive system of
ALMP in Germany. This system is characterized by a wide array of programs which take
place continuously over time and are open to welfare recipients who meet certain eligibility
criteria, where participation can take place at different points of time during the welfare
spell. Recent empirical literature highlights the need to consider the timing of treatment
in the unemployment spell when evaluating treatment effects, see e.g. Abbring and van den
Berg (2003), Sianesi (2004), Thomsen (2007), Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), or Hujer
and Thomsen (2010). Whereas standard evaluation literature usually deals only with
binary information, i.e. whether an individual has been subject to treatment or not, this
literature points out the importance of information on the timing of treatment events
as it conveys useful information for the identification of the treatment effect and has
implications for the definition of the comparison groups. Specifically, the starting point of
the program within the individual welfare spell may be an important determinant for the
selection of participating individuals, as well as for the type of program the individual is
assigned to.
The basis of the empirical analysis is given by the potential outcome approach of causality,
comprehensively described in Heckman et al. (1999) and variously attributed to e.g. Ney-
man (1923), Roy (1951) and Rubin (1974). Following the conventional notation, let Y 1
and Y 0 denote the two potential outcomes, where Y 1 is the outcome when the individual
participates in the program, and Y 0 is the outcome, when the individual does not partici-
pate. Since the individual cannot be in both states at the same time, one of the potential
outcomes is unobservable and direct estimation of the treatment effect is impossible.6
6Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2002) generalize the framework for situations where a whole range of
programs is available. Although we analyze a number of different types of short-term training programs,
the focus of the analysis are the effects of participation compared to non-participation in that program
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Therefore, to identify the treatment effect we have to provide an estimate of the unobserved
state. We focus on the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) at some given
elapsed welfare duration. Conditioning on the elapsed welfare duration is sensible in
the German context for a reason first raised by Sianesi (2004). She argues that in a
comprehensive ALMP system a person will join a program at some point, provided the
individual remains in welfare long enough. Consequently, the reason why an individual is
not observed as participating in a program is that the person has already left the welfare
system, or the time horizon of the analysis is too short. Obviously, although participation
in a program is not mandatory in Germany, like it is for instance in Sweden, it tends
to be true that benefit recipients become more likely to participate in any program the
longer they remain on welfare. The argument is therefore reasonable for the evaluation of
German training programs as well.
In line with that, participation and non-participation have to be defined dynamically, i.e.
with respect to the point in time in which the comparison is made. According to Sianesi
(2004), persons who have neither entered a program nor left welfare up to a specific point
in time are defined as non-participants of interest or ‘waiters’ (in the sense that they are
waiting to be allocated to a program). Thus, non-participation can be interpreted as
the default state for each individual, and everybody is a non-participant until entering a
program or leaving to take up a job. In this context, it should be noted that individuals
who are defined as non-participants at the moment we start our comparison may enter a
program at a later point in time. The evaluation approach in the dynamic setting could be
formalized as follows. Let U = {0, . . . , Umax} define the discrete elapsed welfare duration
of the individual since registration at the local welfare agency. Furthermore, let u denote
the point of time during the welfare spell in which the program of interest starts and Du
the treatment indicator with the discrete time index. Du = 1 if the individual starts a
program at time u of the welfare spell, Du = 0 if the individual remains on welfare at
u. Program effects are estimated for time t, i.e. the time since the program started. The
hypothetical outcomes for time t given a treatment at time u are then defined as Y 1t,u for
individuals who received the treatment at u and Y 0t,u for individuals who did not receive
the treatment at least up to time u. The parameter of interest for each u is the average
effect in t for individuals starting a program in period u of their welfare spell compared
and not relative effects of comparing one type of short-term training with another. Therefore, we forgo
the distinction of J different available programs in the description.
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to not joining at u:
∆ATTt,u = E(Y
1
t,u − Y 0t,u|Du = 1, D1 = · · ·Du−1 = 0)
= E(Y 1t,u|Du = 1, D1 = · · ·Du−1 = 0)
−E(Y 0t,u|Du = 1, D1 = · · ·Du−1 = 0). (1)
Whereas the first term is identified in the data by the observed outcome of the partici-
pants, the second term has to be estimated. Simply using the observable non-participants’
outcomes to approximate the unobservable participants’ outcomes without treatment may
lead to biased estimates due to self-selection.
To solve the selection problem we apply a propensity score matching estimator. The
basic idea of the matching approach is to find, in a large group of non-participants, those
individuals who are similar to the participants in all relevant pre-treatment characteristics
X (‘statistical twins’). However, it is well known that matching can become hazardous
when X is of high dimension. To deal with this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of the propensity score p(X) = E(D = 1|X), i.e. the
probability of participation in a program, summarizing the information of the relevant
covariates X into a single index function. However, for the ATT to be identified with
matching, the so-called conditional independence assumption (CIA, Y 0qD|X in the static
binary case, Lechner, 1998) has to be imposed. It states that, conditional on the set of
relevant (observable) covariates X, the non-participation outcome Y 0 is independent of
the participation decision.
For the dynamic case, we have to invoke an adjusted version, the dynamic conditional
independence assumption (DCIA):
Y 0t,u qDu|p(Xu), D1 = · · · = Du−1 = 0, (2)
i.e. the hypothetical outcome at time t after not participating up to time u is independent
of program participation at time u, conditional on the propensity score p(Xu) measured
at time u. The DCIA ensures that treated and non-treated individuals are comparable
in their non-treatment outcomes at time t conditional on p(Xu), conditional on claiming
welfare benefits up to time u − 1, and conditional on not receiving treatment before u.
In addition, the availability of non-participating analogues for the participants must be
guaranteed (common support), i.e. Pr(D = 1|Xu) < 1 (Smith and Todd, 2005a).
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5.2 Implementation
For the DCIA to hold, it is necessary to observe all covariates that, conditional on having
spent a given welfare duration u, jointly influence the participation decision at that time
(Du) and the outcome variable where such a decision is postponed further (Y 0t,u). In
line with that, we condition on previous welfare experience by stratifying the welfare
duration in quarters. Using this kind of aggregation is useful for consideration of differences
due to the timing of treatments since we expect the probabilities of entering a program
or employment to remain relatively constant within quarters of the welfare spell. For
the propensity scores, we have estimated separate probit models for each group, each
treatment, gender, and the first four quarters of welfare receipt. Each probit estimates
the probability of starting a program in quarter u, conditional on X, conditional on
having reached the welfare duration of u ∈ {1, . . . , 4} quarters, and conditional on not
having received a treatment before u in the welfare spell. Hence, we analyze the effects
of a training program for groups of individuals that join within the first year of the
welfare spell. The outcomes are measured monthly from the first month of the sequent
quarter after (potential) participation onwards until July 2008 due to the time horizon of
the analysis.7 The treatment effects are estimated using kernel density matching on the
estimated propensity score. Standard errors were calculated by bootstrapping with 250
replications.
With regard to the variables selected as relevant to solve the potential self-selection bias,
the comprehensive data at hand provides a sufficient basis. In the empirical specifica-
tion of the propensity score models, we use 21 categories of variables comprising socio-
demographice information like age, marital status, or the number of children, the qualifi-
cation of the individual and information characterizing the employment, unemployment,
and welfare history of the participants dating in some cases dating back until 1990. The
specifications for the final models used in the estimations were obtained by estimating
probit regressions starting with the full set of variables and a stepwise dropping of jointly
insignificant variable-blocks (indicated by F -tests) in order to provide a parsimonious spec-
ification. For this reason, the model specifications vary across the probit models estimated
7For programs assigned in the first quarter of the welfare spell we have an observation period of at least
16 months for each observation. The last entry into the welfare system in our sample is December 31st,
2006. Thus, a program in the first quarter could be assigned until March 31st, 2007. In this case, the
observation period for the outcomes is April 2007 until July 2008. Consequently, for programs assigned
in the second quarter we have an observation period of 13 months. In the third quarter the observation
period lasts for 10 months and in the fourth quarter for 7 months.
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for ethnic groups, quarters of program start, gender, and the programs considered.
The estimated propensity score should guarantee that the included variables are balanced
between treatment and comparison group. To check the balancing property of the esti-
mated propensity score, we applied a procedure suggested by Smith and Todd (2005b):
Xku = β0 + β1pˆ(Xu) + β2pˆ(Xu)
2 + β3pˆ(Xu)3 + β4pˆ(Xu)4
+β5D + β6Dpˆ(Xu) + β7Dpˆ(Xu)2 + β8Dpˆ(Xu)3 + β9Dpˆ(Xu)4. (3)
Eq. (3) was estimated for each variable Xku included in the propensity score of program
participation in quarter u. Afterwards, the null hypothesis of β5 to β9 being jointly zero
was tested. The test indicates, whether there are differences due to the treatment indicator
conditional on a quartic polynomial of the propensity score. If ideal balancing is achieved
all those coefficients should be zero.
Obviously, caseworkers play a crucial role in the process of assignment to programs. Turn-
ing down a placement could be sanctioned by benefit revocation and, hence, caseworkers
can be assumed to have the final word in the participation decision. If the caseworkers act
on unobservable information that is correlated with the individual’s potential labor market
outcomes, the DCIA would be violated. However, it is not very likely that caseworkers
have referred to further unobservable information than the large set of variables recorded.
The data used in this analysis were collected by the caseworkers and supplemented by
their own subjective assessment of the qualification and placement restrictions of the indi-
viduals. Moreover, it should be noted that - to bias the estimates - any further unobserved
information has to jointly influence the participation decision and the outcomes. Given
the large set of variables we considered relevant and we controlled for in the estimations,
we assume that caseworkers act idiosyncratically given the observable characteristics of
the individuals and the subjective assessments.
For interpretation of the results, one has to bear in mind that the chosen comparison
group does not reflect a no-program state, but rather possibly postponed participation.
If we choose as the comparison group those individuals who have been observed to never
participate in the data, this may invalidate the DCIA, as we have to condition on future
outcomes. For unbiased estimation we have to rule out anticipatory effects, else people
would behave differently conditional on future outcomes or treatments. If for example,
non-participants would know in advance to be treated later and when, then matching
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could not solve the selection problem and we would overestimate the treatment effect
since the non-participants have no reason to leave welfare instantly for work. In contrast,
if people dread the prospect of being treated and, again, they know when to be treated
in the future they will leave for work and the program effect is underestimated since non-
participants would differ significantly even after matching from the participants. However,
it is important to note that this is only the case if people know exactly that they will be
treated and when. In line with that, Abbring and van den Berg (2003) point out that the
exclusion of anticipatory effects does not rule out that the individuals know and act on
the determinants of assignment to treatment or labor market outcomes, i.e. individuals
are allowed to adjust their optimal behavior to the determinants of the treatment process,
but not to realization of the treatment. This is not a problem for the analysis as long as
treated and non-treated individuals anticipate the chances of these events conditional on
propensity score and the elapsed welfare duration in a certain quarter in the same way.
Hence, with respect to the assignment process during the individual welfare spell people
may know the determinants, but it is unlikely that they know the realizations of the future
events. For that reason, we assume our estimates not to be affected by anticipatory effects.
5.3 Decomposition of Differences in Treatment Effects
Considering effect heterogeneity in the treatment effects between ethnic groups for a partic-
ular program can be used to reveal important insights. Assuming that identical programs
are provided, differences could be, on the one hand, due to differences in the composition
of the groups, i.e. the distribution of characteristics that are relevant for program and
labor market success may be different. Hence, when conditioning on all these variables no
further differences should occur. However, on the other hand, if residual differences would
remain between the compared ethnic groups these differences are solely due to the ethnic
group attachment of the individual and might be interpreted as potential discrimination.
An important question in the context of providing ALMP for immigrants is whether po-
tential discrimination is identified as the unexplained part of the gap in the difference of
the treatment effects. To analyze the extent of the potential discrimination, we suggest
and apply the following decomposition procedure.
To abbreviate notation, we suppress the indicators of the dynamic setting. Starting point
for the decomposition is the raw differential ∆ATTDif of the differences in the ATTs between
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immigrants and native Germans:
∆ATTDif = ∆
ATT
Mig −∆ATTnG , (4)
with
∆ATTMig = E
(
Y 1 − Y 0|XMig, D = 1
) ∣∣∣∣
Mig=1
, (5)
and
∆ATTnG = E
(
Y 1 − Y 0|XnG, D = 1
) ∣∣∣∣
Mig=0
. (6)
Here, ∆ATTMig denotes the ATT for the immigrants and ∆
ATT
nG is the ATT for the native
Germans who participated in the program under consideration. Both ATTs were estimated
according to the procedure described in the previous section.
To highlight the differences in the raw differential, we have added the relevant conditions
in eq. (5) and (6). Mig is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the group of interest are
immigrants, and 0 if native Germans are considered. Moreover, the ATT of the immigrants
(eq. 5) is conditional on the observable characteristics XMig of the participating immigrants
and the ATT for the native Germans (eq. 6) is conditional on the characteristics XnG of
the participants in that group.
Accordingly, we could decompose the raw differential in eq. (4) into a part which is ex-
plained by differences in observable characteristics and a residual part which cannot be
explained by observables:
∆ATTDif = ∆
ATT
explained + ∆
ATT
residual . (7)
The first term on the right-hand side denotes the part of the difference in the ATTs for im-
migrants and native Germans that is explained by differences in observable characteristics
(e.g. due to a different age or qualification structure). This part is defined as
∆ATTexplained = E
(
Y 1 − Y 0|XMig, D = 1
) ∣∣∣∣
Mig=0
−E
(
Y 1 − Y 0|XnG, D = 1
) ∣∣∣∣
Mig=0
. (8)
It is the difference in ATTs for the native participants when conditioning first on the ob-
servable characteristics XMig of the participating immigrants and second on the observ-
ables XnG of the participating native Germans. If XMig and XnG are identical, ∆ATTexplained
will be 0 and the difference in ATTs for immigrants and natives is not attributable to
differences in observables between the two ethnic groups. However, if XMig 6= XnG, then
∆ATTexplained will in general be nonzero and measure differences in ATTs between immigrants
and natives due to observable characteristics.
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The second term on the right-hand side of eq. (7) denotes the difference in the ATTs for
immigrants and native Germans that is solely due to unobservable differences between the
two groups. Holding the observable characteristics constant, i.e. assuming all individuals
to possess the characteristics XMig of the immigrants, the difference is defined as:
∆ATTresidual = E
(
Y 1 − Y 0|XMig, D = 1
) ∣∣∣∣
Mig=1
− E
(
Y 1 − Y 0|XMig, D = 1
) ∣∣∣∣
Mig=0
. (9)
It is the difference in ATTs between immigrants and natives when conditioning in both
cases on the covariates XMig of the participating immigrants. If covariates XMig are
valued equally in both ethnic groups, then ∆ATTresidual = 0 and the difference in ATTs does not
depend on unobservable characteristics. However, if covariates XMig are valued differently,
then ∆ATTresidual is non-zero and measures the unexplained part of the raw differential ∆
ATT
Dif .
Thus, the proposed decomposition of the differences in the treatment effects is similar
to a difference-in-differences estimator. It allows the ceteris paribus identification of the
difference in program effects that is due to variation in observable characteristics, i.e.
differences in the composition of the immigrant and native participants in the particular
program, and of the part that is due to belonging to the immigrant group. The latter
relates to unobservable differences between immigrants and native Germans. We will refer
to this part as an immigrant fixed effect.
To estimate the difference that is due to unobservable differences (eq. 9), we have to match
participating immigrants with comparable participating native Germans, i.e.XMig = XnG.
To do so, we apply a matching procedure similar to that described above. In the first
step, we estimate the ATTs separately for both ethnic groups and all considered training
programs. In the second step, we keep only the participants in each sample and match
treated immigrants and treated native Germans conditional on the distribution of the
observable characteristics of the treated immigrants. Outcome variable in this matching
step is the individual treatment effect from training for each participant. Therefore, the
resulting effect of the second matching step gives us the average difference in program
effects between immigrants and natives which is due to the immigrant fixed effect keeping
all observable characteristics constant. Analogously to the estimation of the program
effects, we also use a kernel density matching estimator for the second matching step.
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6 Empirical Results
6.1 Quality of the Estimates
For the estimation of program effects we stratify our data by ethnic group, gender and
quarter of program start. In total we are able to estimate treatment effects for 51 different
strata.8 To obtain valid treatment effects it is crucial that the covariates included in the
propensity score estimation are balanced between treatment and comparison group after
matching. As a balancing test we apply the procedure suggested by Smith and Todd
(2005b). Results of this test are summarized in Table 2. The test is passed in 95% or
2,355 of 2,481 cases at the 1% significance level. Thus, balancing is not ideal in every case
but sufficient to obtain valid treatment effects. The matching quality is similar for men
(95%, 1,387 of 1,460 tests passed) and women (95%, 968 of 1,021) as well as for natives
(95%, 1,151 of 1,217) and immigrants (95%, 1,204 of 1,264). Even at the 5% level 2,270
of the total 2,481 tests are passed and 2,184 at the 10% level.
Include Table 2 about here
The exact specifications of the estimated 51 propensity scores cannot be presented here,
but are available upon request from the authors. Results reveal, that especially age, ed-
ucational attainment, professional qualification, household composition, region, and em-
ployment history within the last six years, in particular during the last 24 months before
entering the welfare system, are relevant factors that must be accounted for when esti-
mating the effects of short-term training programs. It turns out that these covariates
are also important in the second matching step when decomposing differences in training
effects between immigrants and natives. In this matching step, we detail the employment
history even further resulting in a large number of variables for the final specification of
the propensity scores. As can be seen from Table 3, covariates are balanced very well and
matching quality is of the same high degree as in the first matching step.
Include Table 3 about here
8In 13 strata the number of treated individuals is too small to estimate valid treatment effects. See
Table 2 for the affected strata.
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6.2 Program Effects
The estimated program effects and corresponding t-values are displayed in Tables 4 to
7. The effects are estimated separately for natives and immigrants, for men and women
and for each quarter. As can be seen from Table 4, aptitude tests have a positive impact
on the probability of native and immigrant males to take up employment providing a
sufficient income above the subsistence level. This positive impact is independent of the
exact timing of the training. However, the absolute size and the significance of the effects
differ across quarters and also between the two considered ethnic groups. For aptitude tests
starting in the first quarter of welfare receipt, we observe larger treatment effects for natives
than for immigrants. Three months after starting the program, the average treatment
effect on the treated for male natives amounts to 6.68 percentage points, whereas the
corresponding value for men with migration background is 4.64 percentage points. Thus,
native participants in aptitude tests have a nearly 7 percentage points larger probability
to take up employment providing a sufficient income than in a situation without training.
Even though the estimated effect for immigrants is about 2 percentage points lower, it is
still of considerable size. During the middle of our observation period the estimated effect
for immigrants increases up to 7 percentage points, but then slightly decreases afterwards.
One year after program start, it amounts to 6.53 percentage points. For native males, we
observe treatment effects ranging between 8 and 9 percentage points six to nine months
after starting the program and an effect of 9.39 percentage points one year after the
training. Consequently, at the end of the observation period the difference in treatment
effects between natives and immigrants is somewhat larger than at the beginning.
Include Table 4 about here
In contrast to the first quarter, we observe that for aptitude tests starting in the second
quarter after the inflow into welfare, the treatment effects are larger for immigrants than
for natives. During the whole observation period, the estimated effect for immigrants
amounts to slightly more than 10 percentage points, whereas the corresponding estimate
for natives ranges between 7.6 and 9.7 percentage points. Thus, for men with migration
background aptitude tests starting in the second quarter of welfare dependency are more
effective than tests starting immediately after the inflow into welfare, while for natives
almost no difference between the first two quarters is detected. In the third quarter, the
23
effectiveness of aptitude tests further increases for immigrants. Nine months after starting
the program, treated immigrants have a 15.7 percentage points larger probability to find
employment than without the training. In contrast, treatment effects for natives are
lower than in the first two quarters. At the end of the observation period, the estimated
treatment effect amounts to 6.4 percentage points and is only slightly significant. In the
fourth quarter, the picture is again reversed. We now find large treatment effects with
a magnitude of more than 15 percentage points for men without migration background,
while the effect for immigrants is lower and amounts to about 10 percentage points.
For women we also find positive effects of aptitude tests, but observe a more uniform
pattern of the estimated effects. Irrespective of the quarter of program start, native females
profit more from aptitude tests than women with a migration background. In the first
quarter, the probability to take up a job providing a sufficient income within one year after
the training increases for a female native participant by about 9.5 percentage points. In
contrast, female immigrants participating in aptitude tests face only a slightly significant
increase of 5.2 percentage points. In the second quarter all estimated employment effects
are insignificant for immigrant females. For native women employment effects are highly
significant and amount to more than 10 percentage points. Similar employment effects for
native females are found in the third quarter. In this quarter, employment effects are also
positive for female immigrants but somewhat lower in magnitude compared to natives and
only slightly significant.
Include Table 5 about here
In contrast to aptitude tests, job search training is rather ineffective (see Table 5). For
native males we estimate insignificant employment effects in all considered quarters. For
male immigrants the estimated effects are also insignificant in the second and third quarter.
Only in the first quarter we observe significantly positive effects nine months after starting
the program of about 6.4 percentage points. However, this value represents a maximum
only and does not describe a long lasting effect.
For female immigrants participating in job search training during the first quarter of their
welfare spell, we observe negative employment effects at the beginning of the observation
period. The probability to take up a job and thereby to leave the welfare system is reduced
by about 5 percentage points in the first six months after the program starts. After this
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locking-in period, the sign of effects turns positive, but the estimates are not statistically
significant. In contrast, the corresponding figures for native women are positive and statis-
tically significant throughout the whole observation period. In the first nine months after
training the treatment effect amounts to about 6 percentage points and then rises further
to 9 percentage points one year after program start. In the second quarter, employment
effects for native women are significantly positive in the middle of the observation period
reaching a maximum of 12 percentage points nine months after program start, but then
slightly decrease. For female immigrants no treatment effects could be obtained for the
second quarter since the number of treated individuals was too low.
Contrary to job search training, skill provision seems to be more effective (see Table 6).
For native men who start training in the first quarter of the welfare spell, we observe
positive employment effects. The training increases the probability of participants to take
up a job and to leave the welfare system by more than 10 percentage points in the second
half of the observation period. For male immigrants we also observe positive employment
effects. However, compared to native men effects are smaller in magnitude and only slightly
significant. One year after program start the probability to find a job is increased by 6
percentage points. In the remaining quarters, employment effects are mostly insignificant
for natives and immigrants. Only for immigrants participating in the third quarter, we
observe increasingly positive effects during the observation period.
Include Table 6 about here
In contrast to the picture observed for men, we find for women and the first quarter
that skill provision is more effective among participants with migration background than
for natives. While for native women employment effects amount to nearly 6 percentage
points one year after program start, we estimate considerably larger effects for immigrants
of about 12.6 percentage points. As opposed to this picture, we find for the second
quarter that employment effects for female immigrants are insignificant, whereas effects
are significantly positive for female natives. For this group, the probability to take up a job
increases by 12.5 percentage points six months after program start and then remains on
a level of about 10 percentage points until the end of the observation period. In the third
quarter all estimated effects are positive but insignificant, while we observe increasingly
negative treatment effects throughout the whole observation period in the fourth quarter.
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Even though some training modules show a positive impact on the probability to take up
employment, the combination of two or three modules in one program is rather ineffective
(see Table 7). For native men we find no significant effect, irrespective of the quarter
considered. A similar picture arises for men with migration background for the first and
second quarter. However, in the third quarter we find increasingly positive employment
effects for this group during the observation period albeit the degree of statistical sig-
nificance is low. Nine months after program start the estimated effect amounts to 7.4
percentage points, but the effect is significant only at the 10% level. A similar devel-
opment of the estimated treatment effects is found for immigrant females participating
in combined training programs in the first quarter of the welfare spell. Here, the effect
amounts to 6.6 percentage points at the end of the observation period. In the second
quarter the corresponding estimate is slightly larger amounting to 7.9 percentage points,
but again the effect is significant only at the 10% level. In the third quarter, we do not
detect any significant effect. For women without migration background, we estimate in-
significant employment effects in all considered quarters. The general ineffectiveness of
combined training programs might be due to the characteristics of the targeted group.
As has been noted above, combined training programs are in particular assigned to those
persons who were out of labor force for a substantial fraction of the final two years before
treatment. These persons are likely to face multiple obstacles for employment uptake,
which might not be remediable by combined training programs.
Include Table 7 about here
To summarize our results, we find pronounced differences in the effectiveness of the consid-
ered training programs. For aptitude tests we observe positive employment effects. While
in the case of women treatment effects are larger for natives than for immigrants, the
picture is ambiguous for men depending on the timing of the training. In some quarters
men with migration background profit more from the training, while in others native men
do better. Skill provision also shows positive employment effects especially when it takes
place right at the beginning of the welfare spell. As in the case of aptitude tests, treatment
effects differ between natives and immigrants and between men and women. For women
and the first quarter we observe that this form of training is more effective among partic-
ipants with migration background. In contrast, for men and the first quarter we find that
natives do better. Irrespective of the migration background the effect of job search training
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is rather limited. Here, we only observe significantly positive employment effects for male
immigrants nine months after program start and significantly positive employment effects
for native females throughout the whole observation period in the first quarter of the
welfare spell. Similarly, the combination of all three training modules is quite ineffective.
While neither native men nor women benefit from the combined training program, we only
find slightly significantly positive employment effects for men with migration background
in the third quarter and for immigrant females in the first two quarters.
Our results are in line with previous empirical evidence. Huber et al. (2009) do not
distinguish between different training modules, but find on average positive employment
effects of short-term training. These positive effects might be driven by aptitude tests and
skill provision. Kopf (2009) uses in her study a distinction of training programs which is
similar to the one used by us. She also estimates positive employment effects of aptitude
tests and skill provision, while job search training and combined training programs seem
to be rather ineffective. However, our estimated treatment effects for aptitude tests and
skill provision are somewhat larger than those reported by her. This might be due to
the different time horizon of the analysis (2006 in our case vs. 2005 in Kopf, 2009) or
the different sampling of the data. While we use an inflow sample, the study by Kopf
(2009) is based on a stock sample. Wolff and Jozwiack (2007) use the same data as Kopf
(2009) but do not distinguish between different training modules. They find that short-
term off-the-job training programs are on average ineffective among immigrant men, while
they significantly decrease employment chances of women with migration background in
the short-run. Our results indicate that the adverse effects for female immigrants might
be caused by job search training. However, we also find that aptitude tests and skill
provision exhibit positive employment effects in this subgroup. So, training programs do
not in general reduce employment chances of women with migration background. The
same is true for male immigrants. In this subgroup we also find positive employment
effects of aptitude tests and skill provision.
6.3 Decomposition Results
The previous subsection showed that the treatment effects of the considered training pro-
grams differ between native and immigrant participants. Therefore, the question arises
what might cause these differences. Are they due to differences in the observable charac-
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teristics of the two groups or are they due to unobservable differences subsumed in the
immigrant fixed effect? To disentangle the influence of both possible explanations we de-
compose the differences in the treatment effects between natives and immigrants in two
parts: the part which is caused by differences in observables and the residual part due
to the immigrant fixed effect. Differences due to the immigrant fixed effect are of major
policy concern, since in this case discrimination in the effectiveness of training programs
is present. Therefore, in the following we concentrate on differences in treatment effects
due to unobservables. Table 8 displays the relevant results.9
The first row of each block in the table depicts the raw differential of differences in the
ATTs between immigrants and native Germans for the respective program. This raw
differential is calculated from the results presented in the previous subsection. The p-
value denotes statistical significance of the difference in ATTs of natives and immigrants.
The third row of each block in the table is denoted by ∆ATTresidual and shows the estimated
part of the raw differential which is due to the immigrant fixed effect. In other words,
∆ATTresidual indicates by how much the treatment effect of a program is changed due to the
migration background holding all other factors fixed.
The entry 0.0135 in the top left block of Table 8 states that male immigrant participants
in an aptitude test have on average a 1.35 percentage points larger treatment effect con-
cerning employment uptake three months after program start than native participants
with identical sociodemographic characteristics. Therefore, immigrants benefit more from
aptitude tests than natives holding all other characteristics constant. However, this immi-
grant fixed effect is not statistically significant as can be seen from the t-value. Six months
after program start, we observe a similar picture. The immigrant fixed effect is positive
but insignificant. During the following months, the immigrant fixed effect increases and
reaches a maximum of 6.39 percentage points nine months after program start. In this
month, the effect is statistically significant at the 10% level. At the end of the observation
period, the immigrant fixed effect decreases and amounts to about 3 percentage points one
year after assignment. Even though the effect again lacks statistical significance it is of
considerable size. Thus, the difference in program effectiveness between immigrants and
natives is not insubstantial.
For women participating in aptitude tests we arrive at a similar conclusion. Female natives
9We only decompose the differences in the treatment effects for the first quarter, since in the other
quarters the number of program participants is too small.
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have a larger treatment effect than immigrants resulting in a negative raw differential. The
negative sign of the raw differential is driven by differences in observable characteristics
between the two ethnic groups. Keeping all covariates constant, immigrants tend even to
benefit more from aptitude tests than natives as indicated by the positive immigrant fixed
effect. However, again this positive immigrant fixed effect is not statistically significant
although it is of considerable size.
When looking at job search training targeted at male welfare recipients, we do not estimate
statistically significant immigrant fixed effects. In contrast, we observe for women that in
the short-run immigrant participants clearly benefit less than natives from this form of
training. The negative raw differential indicates that the treatment effect for immigrants
is smaller than for natives. As can be seen from the p-value, differences in ATTs between
both groups are statistically significant during the first six months of the observation
period. The large gap in treatment effects is caused by the immigrant fixed effect. Keeping
everything else constant, immigrant females participating in job search training have a
nearly 15 percentage points lower treatment effect than native participants.10 Even though
the negative immigrant fixed effect fades away nine months after program start, this is an
alarming result. Job search training decreases rather than increases employment chances
of female immigrants.
In contrast, female immigrants clearly benefit from skill provision. For this form of training
the immigrant fixed effect increases over time and amounts to 14 percentage points one
year after program start. Thus, netting out observable differences between immigrants
and natives, the former have on average a 14 percentage points larger treatment effect
than the latter.11 For men, we do not find statistically significant differences between the
two ethnic groups. Here, as opposed to women, the immigrant fixed effect is of negative
sign at the end of the observation period indicating that immigrants tend to benefit less
from the training than natives.
For the combined training programs, we do not find statistically significant differences
either. While the immigrant fixed effect tends to be negative for men, it tends to be
positive for women. These results reflect the finding that combined programs are rather
ineffective for both ethnic groups and for both genders.
10Due to large standard errors, the immigrant fixed effect is only slightly significant in the first three
months after program start.
11Again, due to large standard errors, the immigrant fixed effect is only slightly significant.
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To sum up, we find that aptitude tests yield larger treatment effects for natives than for
immigrants. The lower treatment effects for immigrants are due to differences in observable
characteristics. Keeping all observables constant, immigrants even tend to benefit more
from this training module than identical natives. Job search training impacts similarly on
native and immigrant men, once it is controlled for all observable differences. In contrast,
female immigrant participants are clearly disadvantaged. Job search training does not
seem to be designed for this group and might not meet the needs of female immigrants.
Better suited courses are needed for this group. In contrast, skill provision seems to
meet the needs of female immigrants, who benefit more from this program than identical
natives. However, this result might indicate that caseworkers undervalue the productivity
of immigrants but learn from the training about unexpected opportunities to place the
treated. This might, of course, be beneficial for the treated but gives concern to a poor
performance of the untreated. The effectiveness of combined training programs does not
differ significantly between immigrants and natives with identical characteristics.
7 Conclusion
Based on comprehensive administrative data on immigrant and native welfare recipients
in Germany, we have evaluated the employment effects of four different short-term off-the-
job training programs. In particular, we have investigated whether program effects differ
between the two ethnic groups and what causes these differences.
Our estimation results show that the considered training programs exhibit substantial
effect heterogeneity. For aptitude tests we observe on average positive employment effects.
While in the sample of women treatment effects are larger for natives than for immigrants,
the picture is ambiguous for men depending on the timing of the training. Aptitude
tests starting in the second or third quarter of welfare receipt generate larger treatment
effects for immigrants, whereas native men benefit more from tests in the first and fourth
quarter. The difference in ATTs of natives and immigrants in the first quarter is mainly
due to differences in observable characteristics between the two ethnic groups. Keeping
all covariates constant, immigrants tend to benefit even more from aptitude tests than
natives.
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Job search training is ineffective for men irrespective of the migration background. Native
women benefit from this form of training, while immigrant females face negative treat-
ment effects. The large difference in treatment effects of native and immigrant women
cannot be explained by observable characteristics and must instead be attributed to the
immigrant fixed effect. Holding everything else constant, immigrant females participating
in job search training have a nearly 15 percentage point lower treatment effect than native
participants. Even though the negative immigrant fixed effect fades away nine months af-
ter program start, this result gives cause for serious concern. Job search training decreases
rather than increases employment chances of female immigrants. Therefore, immediate
action has to be taken by welfare agencies to develop better suited programs.
In contrast, female immigrants clearly benefit from skill provision, which is a program
exhibiting positive effects in general when assigned early during the welfare spell. For this
form of training the immigrant fixed effect increases over time and amounts to 14 percent-
age points one year after the program begins. Thus, netting out observable differences
between immigrants and natives, the former have on average a 14 percentage points larger
treatment effect than the latter. Caseworkers might undervalue the productivity of female
immigrants, but could learn from the training and intensify their placement effort once
they are aware of the true potential of the treated. This could also explain the positive
immigrant fixed effect observed for aptitude tests. However, for men participating in skill
provision we do not find statistically significant differences between the two ethnic groups.
For the combined training programs, we do not find statistically significant differences
in any subgroup. These results reflect the finding that combined programs are rather
ineffective for both ethnic groups and for both genders. The general ineffectiveness of
combined training programs might be due to the characteristics of the targeted group,
since combined programs are in particular assigned to those persons who were out of the
labor force for a substantial fraction of the final two years before treatment. These persons
are likely to face multiple obstacles for employment uptake, which might not be remediable
by combined training programs.
Our results reveal that not all training programs impact equally on native and immigrant
welfare recipients. Differences are especially pronounced for women participating in job
search training and skill provision. While immigrants benefit more than natives from skill
provision, they are clearly disadvantaged by job search training. The underlying reasons
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for this opposing trend cannot be pinned down on the basis of our analysis. Further re-
search is also needed with respect to the large size of standard errors in the decomposition
which prevents us in some cases to detect significant immigrant fixed effects albeit effects
are of considerable size. One explanation for this could be a high degree of heterogeneity
in the immigrant group (despite having controlled for many observed characteristics). For
example, the immigrant fixed effect could differ across various country-of-origin groups.
Possibly, considering more homogenous ethnic groups could shed more light onto this prob-
lem. On the other hand, our results also indicate a general potential for welfare agencies
to improve the targeting of programs at participants based on observable characteristics.
Again, further research is needed to advise welfare agencies on how to use programs in
the most effective and efficient way. This should contribute to reducing the high number
of welfare recipients in Germany.
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Table 1: Unemployment Benefits II and Short-term Training Programs
2005 2006 2007 2008
Persons entitled to UBII (avg. annual stock)a 4,981,748 5,392,166 5,276,835 5,009,656
Spending for UBII (in billion Euro)b 32.8 34.7 31.5 30.2
Spending for ALMP (overall, in billion Euro)b 3.1 3.8 4.2 4.7
New Participants in Short-term Training Programsa 410,900 533,634 519,783 627,739
a Figures obtained from Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009).
b Figures obtained from Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2009b).
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Table 2: Results for Smith and Todd (2005b) balancing test
Men Women
p > .1 p > .05 p > .01 Regres-
sors
p > .1 p > .05 p > .01 Regres-
sors
Aptitude tests
Quarter 1
Natives 28 31 35 37 42 44 44 46
Immigrants 66 70 72 74 40 42 44 44
Quarter 2
Natives 50 54 56 58 38 38 39 39
Immigrants 36 36 38 40 51 53 54 59
Quarter 3
Natives 36 37 38 38 38 40 42 45
Immigrants 66 67 68 74 27 29 30 32
Quarter 4
Natives 30 31 33 35 / / / /
Immigrants 45 48 53 55 / / / /
Job search training
Quarter 1
Natives 58 61 63 65 41 43 44 48
Immigrants 51 54 59 66 47 48 49 50
Quarter 2
Natives 41 42 45 46 31 32 32 32
Immigrants 73 74 77 80 / / / /
Quarter 3
Natives 23 24 24 26 / / / /
Immigrants / / / / / / / /
Quarter 4
Natives / / / / / / / /
Immigrants / / / / / / / /
Skill provision
Quarter 1
Natives 48 51 52 54 44 46 49 52
Immigrants 55 55 60 62 51 53 53 55
Quarter 2
Natives 33 36 37 42 35 35 36 38
Immigrants 34 35 37 39 63 65 67 69
Quarter 3
Natives 57 58 61 68 40 43 47 50
Immigrants 32 32 32 33 40 40 41 44
Quarter 4
Natives 45 49 52 55 34 34 36 39
Immigrants 53 56 58 59 25 26 27 29
Combined training programs
Quarter 1
Natives 51 55 56 62 36 39 40 44
Immigrants 76 77 80 83 52 56 56 59
Quarter 2
Natives 50 53 54 57 32 32 32 34
Immigrants 43 43 44 44 40 42 43 48
Quarter 3
Natives 34 36 37 38 27 28 29 30
Immigrants 27 28 28 31 33 33 34 35
Quarter 4
Natives 36 36 38 39 / / / /
Immigrants / / / / / / / /
Remarks: Fields marked by a / indicate that the number of treated individuals in the respective cell was
too low to estimate valid treatment effects.
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Table 3: Smith and Todd (2005b) balancing test for decomposition
Men Women
p > .1 p > .05 p > .01 Regres-
sors
p > .1 p > .05 p > .01 Regres-
sors
Aptitude tests 50 53 57 57 63 63 65 65
Job search training 63 64 68 69 68 70 70 70
Skill provision 43 44 46 47 50 50 51 52
Combined programs 44 46 48 50 78 80 81 81
Table 4: Effects of aptitude tests
Men Women
Month after program start: 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
Quarter 1 Treated: 507 natives and 448 immigr. Treated: 297 natives and 180 immigr.
Natives
0.0668 0.0867 0.0834 0.0939 0.0490 0.0690 0.0673 0.0948
3.76 4.42 4.04 4.61 2.42 3.05 2.74 3.71
Immigrants
0.0464 0.0441 0.0703 0.0653 0.0425 0.0727 0.0608 0.0524
2.66 2.44 3.55 3.06 1.82 2.69 2.19 1.80
Quarter 2 Treated: 260 natives and 213 immigr. Treated: 99 natives and 85 immigr.
Natives
0.0965 0.0848 0.0760 0.0947 0.0675 0.1205 0.1170 0.1159
3.88 3.26 2.84 3.46 1.69 2.65 2.61 2.62
Immigrants
0.1007 0.1032 0.1129 0.1020 0.0227 0.0194 -0.0111 0.0531
3.77 3.73 3.69 3.30 0.69 0.57 -0.35 1.21
Quarter 3 Treated: 138 natives and 143 immigr. Treated: 62 natives and 76 immigr.
Natives
0.0815 0.0889 0.0640 - 0.1126 0.0890 0.0992 -
2.43 2.51 1.86 - 2.25 1.79 1.79 -
Immigrants
0.1033 0.1279 0.1566 - 0.0601 0.0665 0.0767 -
3.17 4.02 4.32 - 1.63 1.60 1.79 -
Quarter 4 Treated: 91 natives and 98 immigr.
Natives
0.1532 0.1857 - - / / - -
3.24 3.71 - - / / - -
Immigrants
0.1085 0.0943 - - / / - -
2.95 2.49 - - / / - -
Remarks: Displayed are average treatment effects on the treated and corresponding t-values. Standard
errors have been obtained through bootstrapping based on 250 replications. Fields marked by a - indicate
that no outcome variable could be observed for the respective month. Fields marked by a / indicate that
the number of treated individuals in the respective cell was too low to estimate valid treatment effects.
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Table 5: Effects of job search training
Men Women
Month after program start: 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
Quarter 1 Treated: 303 natives and 270 immigr. Treated: 189 natives and 102 immigr.
Natives
-0.0123 0.0307 0.0224 0.0329 0.0621 0.0585 0.0556 0.0910
-0.65 1.24 0.93 1.24 2.31 1.98 1.82 2.87
Immigrants
-0.0014 0.0193 0.0637 0.0414 -0.0382 -0.0564 0.0131 0.0362
-0.08 0.85 2.69 1.77 -2.10 -2.87 0.41 0.96
Quarter 2 Treated: 116 natives and 110 immigr. Treated: 69 natives
Natives
-0.0073 0.0191 -0.0045 0.0026 0.0703 0.1005 0.1205 0.0848
-0.24 0.57 -0.13 0.07 1.54 2.06 2.31 1.62
Immigrants
0.0034 -0.0323 0.0126 0.0193 / / / /
0.12 -1.14 0.33 0.47 / / / /
Quarter 3 Treated: 48 natives
Natives
-0.0399 -0.0120 0.0191 - / / / -
-1.03 -0.25 0.35 - / / / -
Immigrants
/ / / - / / / -
/ / / - / / / -
Quarter 4
Natives
/ / - - / / - -
/ / - - / / - -
Immigrants
/ / - - / / - -
/ / - - / / - -
Remarks: Displayed are average treatment effects on the treated and corresponding t-values. Standard
errors have been obtained through bootstrapping based on 250 replications. Fields marked by a - indicate
that no outcome variable could be observed for the respective month. Fields marked by a / indicate that
the number of treated individuals in the respective cell was too low to estimate valid treatment effects.
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Table 6: Effects of skill provision
Men Women
Month after program start: 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
Quarter 1 Treated: 288 natives and 244 immigr. Treated: 218 natives and 133 immigr.
Natives
0.0430 0.0764 0.1192 0.1026 0.0318 0.0556 0.0639 0.0591
1.83 2.72 4.23 3.60 1.47 2.15 2.30 2.02
Immigrants
0.0218 0.0497 0.0522 0.0617 0.0741 0.0956 0.1153 0.1263
0.96 1.89 1.87 2.09 2.64 3.14 3.38 3.56
Quarter 2 Treated: 160 natives and 146 immigr. Treated: 152 natives and 80 immigr.
Natives
0.0157 0.0380 0.0308 -0.0029 0.0609 0.1253 0.1148 0.0934
0.57 1.15 0.93 -0.08 1.92 3.26 3.05 2.61
Immigrants
-0.0096 0.0332 -0.0084 0.0032 -0.0052 0.0039 -0.0026 -0.0068
-0.42 1.15 -0.29 0.10 -0.21 0.14 -0.08 -0.21
Quarter 3 Treated: 94 natives and 82 immigr. Treated: 72 natives and 52 immigr.
Natives
0.0124 -0.0115 -0.0016 - 0.0163 0.0201 0.0253 -
0.36 -0.32 -0.04 - 0.43 0.49 0.55 -
Immigrants
0.0213 0.0527 0.0998 - 0.0489 0.0086 0.0503 -
0.59 1.21 2.19 - 1.17 0.22 1.10 -
Quarter 4 Treated: 69 natives and 67 immigr. Treated: 48 natives and 41 immigr.
Natives
0.0722 0.0688 - - -0.0214 -0.0486 - -
1.59 1.44 - - -0.81 -1.83 - -
Immigrants
0.1028 0.0563 - - -0.0231 -0.0400 - -
2.29 1.29 - - -1.03 -1.78 - -
Remarks: Displayed are average treatment effects on the treated and corresponding t-values. Standard
errors have been obtained through bootstrapping based on 250 replications. Fields marked by a - indicate
that no outcome variable could be observed for the respective month.
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Table 7: Effects of combined training programs
Men Women
Month after program start: 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
Quarter 1 Treated: 410 natives and 360 immigr. Treated: 188 natives and 135 immigr.
Natives
0.0045 0.0306 0.0293 0.0289 0.0116 0.0157 0.0167 0.0066
0.28 1.52 1.39 1.38 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.23
Immigrants
0.0069 0.0316 0.0208 0.0272 -0.0027 0.0142 0.0533 0.0656
0.38 1.47 1.01 1.21 -0.13 0.51 1.61 1.87
Quarter 2 Treated: 180 natives and 157 immigr. Treated: 113 natives and 95 immigr.
Natives
0.0207 0.0089 0.0374 0.0379 0.0470 0.0459 0.0399 0.0452
0.75 0.31 1.15 1.07 1.32 1.26 1.06 1.19
Immigrants
0.0082 0.0271 0.0054 0.0519 0.0586 0.0512 0.0742 0.0786
0.31 0.94 0.18 1.57 1.73 1.48 1.92 2.02
Quarter 3 Treated: 90 natives and 96 immigr. Treated: 66 natives and 56 immigr.
Natives
-0.0250 -0.0262 -0.0355 - 0.0107 0.0176 0.0256 -
-0.89 -0.76 -0.98 - 0.30 0.42 0.55 -
Immigrants
0.0154 0.0588 0.0744 - 0.0247 0.0228 0.0600 -
0.50 1.48 1.70 - 0.67 0.55 0.15 -
Quarter 4 Treated: 63 natives
Natives
-0.0407 -0.0108 - - / / - -
-1.31 -0.24 - - / / - -
Immigrants
/ / - - / / - -
/ / - - / / - -
Remarks: Displayed are average treatment effects on the treated and corresponding t-values. Standard
errors have been obtained through bootstrapping based on 250 replications. Fields marked by a - indicate
that no outcome variable could be observed for the respective month. Fields marked by a / indicate that
the number of treated individuals in the respective cell was too low to estimate valid treatment effects.
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Table 8: Differences in treatment effects between natives and immigrants
Men Women
Month after program start: 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12
Aptitude tests
∆ATTDif -0.0204 -0.0426 -0.0131 -0.0286 -0.0065 -0.0037 -0.0065 -0.0424
p-value 0.4130 0.1192 0.6492 0.3388 0.8389 0.9206 0.8644 0.2953
∆ATTresidual 0.0135 0.0172 0.0639 0.0303 0.0320 0.0605 0.0421 0.0111
t-value 0.41 0.50 1.85 0.75 0.69 1.17 0.75 0.19
Job search training
∆ATTDif 0.0109 -0.0114 0.0413 0.0085 -0.1003 -0.1149 -0.0425 -0.0548
p-value 0.6848 0.7294 0.2463 0.8175 0.0104 0.0071 0.3789 0.2996
∆ATTresidual 0.0044 -0.0039 0.0239 -0.0319 -0.1488 -0.1434 -0.0002 0.0072
t-value 0.09 -0.06 0.36 -0.46 -1.74 -1.52 0.00 0.06
Skill provision
∆ATTDif -0.0212 -0.0267 -0.0670 -0.0409 0.0423 0.0400 0.0514 0.0672
p-value 0.5028 0.4680 0.0873 0.3101 0.2563 0.3538 0.2633 0.1585
∆ATTresidual 0.0107 0.0231 -0.0778 -0.0591 0.0962 0.1149 0.1298 0.1401
t-value 0.23 0.48 -1.46 -0.99 1.62 1.69 1.65 1.69
Combined training programs
∆ATTDif 0.0024 0.0010 -0.0085 -0.0017 -0.0143 -0.0015 0.0366 0.0590
p-value 0.9205 0.9714 0.7753 0.9580 0.6713 0.9715 0.4068 0.2012
∆ATTresidual 0.0014 -0.0278 -0.0191 -0.0386 0.0387 0.0182 0.0814 0.0426
t-value 0.04 -0.59 -0.39 -0.75 0.50 0.21 0.85 0.39
Remarks: ∆ATTDif denotes the mean difference in the ATTs between immigrants and native Germans for
the respective program and month after program start. The p-values derive from t-tests on the equality of
the ATTs in the group of natives and immigrants. ∆ATTresidual is based on the matching approach described
in section 4.3 and denotes the estimated difference in the ATTs for immigrants and native Germans that
is solely due to unobservable differences between the two ethnic groups, or in other words, which is due to
the immigrant fixed effect. t-values denote significance of these immigrant fixed effects. Standard errors
have been obtained through bootstrapping based on 250 replications.
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A Data Appendix
In this appendix we provide selected descriptive statistics. The means of the variables
depicted in Tables A.1 to A.8 refer to participants in the considered training programs
before matching. Thus, the number of observations might differ from the number of
observations displayed in Tables 4 to 7. The tables are stratified according to the ethnic
group and the quarter of program start. The p-values derive from t-tests on the equality
of means of the displayed variables between natives and immigrants for the respective
quarter.
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